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OPENING THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
TO ALTERNATIVES
STEVEN

R.

LINDEMANNt

INTRODUCTION

The federal sentencing guidelines promulgated under the
authority of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the Act),' and
recently upheld by the United States Supreme Court against
constitutional challenge 2 place limits on the discretion of federal courts that revolutionize the process of sentencing federal
offenders. Never before have federal judges been required by
law to conform their sentences to anything other than the statutory minimum and maximum penalties for the conviction of a
crime.3 Reactions to the guidelines vary widely among judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, legislators, and academics. 4
Virtually all parties agree, however, that the guidelines will increase the use of imprisonment for many types of offenders.
This article criticizes this development and presents an alternative guideline system that will open the sentencing process to a
wide spectrum of criminal sanctions. The article also encourages judges to implement nonimprisonment sentences within
the current guideline system and demonstrates that the use of
nonimprisonment alternatives conforms to the intentions of
Congress as they are manifested in the Act.
t A.B. with distinction from Stanford University 1985; J.D. from Yale Law
School 1988; current law clerk to the Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota. The author would like to thank Prof.
Daniel J. Freed of the Yale Law School for providing helpful input.
1. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as Chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, October 12, 1984 (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-86, 3621-25, 3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (Supp. II
1984)).
2. In Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989), the Supreme Court ruled
that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the sentencing guidelines regime do not
violate the constitutional doctrines of separation of powers and nondelegation.
3. See id. "Congress delegated almost unfettered discretion to the sentencing
judge to determine what the sentence should be within the customarily wide range so
selected (by Congress]." Id.
4. See, e.g., Post-MistrettaForum: How Can Guideline Sentencing Be Improved?, 1 FED.
SENT. R. 359-76 (1989).
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In the early 1970s Federal District Judge Marvin Frankel
spurred reform of the federal criminal sentencing regime with
his book, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order. Frankel described a regime in which judges who possessed little or no
training exercised broad discretion in formulating sentences.
No obligation to state reasons for a particular sentence burdened the judges' discretion, and for the most part the
sentences imposed were not subject to appellate review. This
state of affairs prompted Frankel to remark that "the almost
wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in
the fashioning of sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a
5
society that professes devotion to the rule of law."
In response to mounting calls for reform Congress passed
the Sentencing Reform Act. The Act created the United States
Sentencing Commission (the Commission) 6 and granted it the
authority to promulgate guidelines to govern the sentencing
practices of the federal judiciary. As set forth in section 991 of
the Act, the primary purpose of the Commission was to establish sentencing policies and practices that
provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken
into account in the establishment of general sentencing
7
practices.
The sentencing guidelines ultimately adopted by the Commission became effective on November 1, 1987. The guidelines regime focuses on two sets of factors-offense
characteristics and offender characteristics. The guidelines
designate a base offense level ranging from one to forty-three
for each statutorily defined crime. 8 Specific offense guidelines
include adjustments based on the amount of property in5.

M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5

(1973).

6. The President appoints all seven of the voting members of the Commission.

At least three members must be federal judges, and no more than four members may
belong to the same political party. The President also appoints one nonvoting member, and the Attorney General, or his designee, sits as a nonvoting, ex-officio member
as well. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
8.

See UNITED STATES SENTENCING

LINE MANUAL

ch. 2 (1988) [hereinafter

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss3/4
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volved, whether firearms were used, the degree of personal injury sustained by the victim, and so on. In addition, the
guidelines set forth general adjustment provisions applicable
to all offenses. These relate to the status of the victim, the offender's specific role in the offense, obstruction of justice, and
acceptance of responsibility. 9
The offender characteristics deemed relevant by the Commission relate to prior criminal history.10 From the offender's
prior record the court calculates a criminal history score. Specifically excluded from the calculus are the offender's age, education, vocational skills, mental condition, emotional
condition, physical condition, previous employment record,
family ties and responsibilities, and community ties. "
To choose the appropriate guideline sentence the court consults a two-dimensional matrix with offense level and criminal
history category as its two axes. Each combination of offense
level and criminal history score yields a specific range of
months of imprisonment. Nonimprisonment or probation
sentences may be substituted for a sentence of months in
prison, but the guidelines strictly limit the availability of nonimprisonment sanctions to a small area of the matrix.1 2
Given this background, the objectives of this article are
threefold. The first part of the article argues that the guidelines fall short of the mandates of the Sentencing Reform Act
in several important respects and that where the Act and the
guidelines are at odds judges must follow the Act. The second
part proposes a guideline system that encourages the use of
nonimprisonment sanctions in a manner that is faithful to the
objectives of the Act and that is consistent with the Act's terms.
The final section of the article suggests means by which judges
can both operate within the current guideline regime and at
the same time steer it back to the course of reform that Congress mapped out in the Act.
I.

INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE CURRENT GUIDELINES AND
THE MANDATES OF THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT

The guidelines are a positive step toward bringing order to
9.
10.
11.
12.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

at
at
at
at

ch.
ch.
ch.
ch.

3.
4.
5 pt. H.
5 pt. B; see infra text accompanying note 41.
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the federal criminal sentencing system. Prior to the guidelines
criminal sentencing was cloaked in the mantle of judicial discretion. Courts afforded little or no appellate review of
sentences, and the rationale behind sentences was hidden from
view. Against this background the Commission conducted research into crimes of conviction, sentences imposed, and time
served by offenders. The Commission also solicited expert
and general public comment through a number of public hearings. Considering the paucity of empirical data available and
the discretionary nature of the sentencing system then in
effect, both the Commission's efforts and its results are
commendable.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the Commission's achievements should not overshadow the serious flaws embodied in its
guidelines. This article focuses on three such flaws. First, the
guidelines neglect the relationship between the basic purposes
that justify criminal sentencing in general and the application
of those purposes to specific fact situations. Second, the
guidelines unduly restrict the availability of nonimprisonment
sanctions. Finally, the guidelines ignore the resource constraints under which the sentencing system must operate, the
most palpable being prison overcrowding. These inadequacies
not only compromise the effectiveness of the guidelines, they
bring the guidelines into conflict with the purpose and explicit
provisions of the Act as well.
A.

Sentencing Purposes

Section 3553 of the Act sets out the factors to be considered
in imposing a criminal sentence. Prominent among them are
the four underlying purposes of sentencing. The statute describes them as the need for the sentence:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with the
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or
3
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.1

In short, these are the traditional purposes ofjust punishment,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
13.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
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Congress did not include section 3553 in the Act merely to
suggest what a judge should have in mind when sentencing an
offender. According to section 994(f) of the Act, a primary
purpose of the Commission is to "establish sentencing policies
and practices.., that.., assure the meeting of the purposes of
sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2).'

4

The legisla-

tive history behind this provision emphasizes that both the
Commission and the courts are bound. The Senate Report on
the Sentencing Reform Act, the most comprehensive legislative history available, states that the Act "requires the Sentencing Commission to consider [the four basic] purposes in
developing guidelines and policy statements." As the Senate
Report further notes, the Act requires sentencing judges to
consider them "in imposing sentence."' 5
The Act does not require or even encourage the Commission to designate one or another purpose as the sole philosophical basis for the guidelines regime. Nor does the Act
furnish clues regarding the order in which Congress would
have ranked the four purposes. Congress purposely refrained
from assigning them priorities.' 6 Instead, Congress intended
that a judge working within the guidelines system consider each
of the purposes "in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed."' 7 The Commission should have established rules
or principles to govern this inquiry. At a minimum the guidelines must allow the court to conduct an analysis of purposes in
each case and to have that analysis influence the sentence in
some meaningful way.
The Commission lost sight of the full range of purposes beginning with its research methodology. The Commission
claims that its "empirical approach" was faithful to existing
sentencing practice. It gathered data from 10,500 cases regarding the elements of the offense committed, the offender's
background and criminal record, the method of disposition of
the case (i.e., guilty plea or conviction), the sentence imposed,
and the time served. 8 The Commission calculated the average
time served by various kinds of offenders over the entire range
14. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(Supp. IV 1986).
15. S.REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 59-60, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 3182, 3242-43 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
16. Id. at 67-68.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (emphasis added).
18. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE IN-
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of offenses and identified a number of relevant distinctions
that seemed to influence the sentences.
The list of empirical data considered by the Commission appears comprehensive, but its elements are more probative of
sentencing outcomes than sentencing practices. For example,
if two judges had sentenced identical offenders for identical
crimes, the judges may have arrived at their sentences by
means of entirely different thought processes. One judge may
have determined that the offender was amenable to rehabilitation and therefore sentenced him to probation under the condition that the offender receive the appropriate treatment and
counseling. The other judge may have decided that the offender was dangerous and needed to be locked up. On the
basis of certain assumptions' 9 one can average these
sentences, but what is the significance of this figure? It reveals
nothing about the jurisprudence of either judge. In fact, the
average sentence hides the rationale used by the judges in formulating their sentences.
The Commission admits that its methodology may have
blurred distinctions between the philosophies of sentencing
judges, but it rationalizes that, "[g]iven the disagreement that
exists among judges about the 'rules of sentencing,' no statistical model could replicate judicial decision making." 20 Adherence to a method of statistical modelling deprived the
Commission of access to a rich body of information. The
Commission's empirical approach may have uncovered the factors that influence sentencing, but investigation into the
thought processes of judges may have brought to light the
ways in which those factors relate to one another when combined together in a particular case.
Notwithstanding the incompleteness of its data base, the
Commission drafted sentencing guidelines. The Commission
claims that it carefully avoided "slavishly adher[ing] to current
sentencing practices," but it concedes that the guidelines essentially constrain "sentences within a fairly narrow range centered about average current practice." 21 This result does not
ITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS
ter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT].

21 (June 18, 1987) [hereinaf-

19. The Commission assumed that probation was equivalent to zero months imprisonment. See infra text accompanying notes 43-44.

20.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT,

21.

Id. at 17.

supra note 18, at 22.
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further the objectives of sentencing reform. It may appear to
advance the goal of reducing disparity, but Congress was not
concerned about disparity per se. Congress sought to reduce
unwarranted disparity-that which has no justifiable basis.
The Senate Report makes this point well: "The key word in
discussing unwarranted disparity is 'unwarranted.' The Committee does not mean to suggest that sentencing policies and
practices should eliminate justifiable differences between the
sentences of persons convicted of similar offenses who have
22
similar records."
The Commission recognized its duty under sections
3553(a)(2) and 994(f) to give effect to the four purposes of
sentencing but concluded that the results of its empirical
method satisfied the obligation. Average sentencing outcomes, in the Commission's view, embody the collective philosophical wisdom ofjudges because "[i]n practice, the differing
23
philosophies are generally consistent with the same result."
The legislative history of the Act exposes the error in the
Commission's logic:
[T]he Committee has deliberately not shown a preference
for one purpose of sentencing over another in the belief
that different purposes may play greater or lesser roles in
sentencing for different types of defendants.... The intent
of [section 3553] (a)(2) is . . . to require that the judge consider what impact, if any, each particular purpose should
24
have on the sentence in each case.
B.

Nonimprisonment Sanctions

When a child misbehaves parents often consider a variety of
alternatives to teach the child right from wrong, to encourage
appropriate behavior, to impose punishment, or to coerce the
child to make amends for his behavior. Often the circumstances surrounding the misdeeds dictate the course of action
chosen. If the child purposely breaks a neighbor's window, the
parents may require restitution. On the other hand, if the vandalism is part of a pattern of rebellion against the child's parents, some kind of family counseling may be appropriate. If
the problem is inattention to homework, the parents may re22.

SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 161.
23. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 18, at
24. SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 77.
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strict television privileges or social activities. Certainly a variety of punishments might be appropriate, including the more
traditional options of confining the child to the house or sending him to his room.
In most instances criminal sentencing involves much more
serious misbehavior, but the principles applicable to dealing
with the misbehavior of children are nonetheless relevant to
sentencing decisions. In recent years a growing number of
state and federal court judges have formulated sentences tailored to meet the specific needs of offenders and to protect the
public at the same time. Some judges imposed such sentences
pursuant to a comprehensive program of alternative sanctions.
Others drew on their experience and constructed sentences
that they deemed to be most appropriate given the offender's
circumstances and the resources locally available.
When considering sentencing reform legislation Congress
knew about nonimprisonment sanctions and incorporated
them into the Act. According to the Senate Report, "[t]he
comprehensive sentencing provisions of the bill provide a full
range of sentencing options." 2 5 Many of these options are
listed in section 3563(b) of the Act, which describes the conditions of probation that a court may impose. This provision authorizes the court to impose fines, restitution and community
service orders. The court also may require the probationer to
procure and maintain suitable employment, a course of study,
vocational training or treatment for problems such as drug or
alcohol addiction. Among the numerous other conditions
listed, the court also may restrict the place in which the probationer resides.
Currently it is common practice for courts to impose fines in
criminal cases. According to a study conducted by the Vera
Institute of Justice, "fines are widely used as a criminal sanction and their use is not confined to traffic offenses and minor
ordinance violations. Many American courts depend heavily
on fines, alone or as the principal component of a sentence in
which the fine is combined with another sanction. ' 26 Almost a
third of the sentences imposed in federal district courts involve
25. Id. at 159.
26. Hillsman, Sichel & Mahoney, Fines in Sentencing: A Study of the Use of the Fine as a
Criminal Sanction (summary abstract)(1984).
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fines. Annually, this represents fifty million dollars in fines. 2 7
One criticism leveled at those who would expand the use of
fines is that fines are rarely collected. However, the Vera Institute study found that "a number of courts frequently impose
fine sentences upon offenders with limited means and are relatively successful in collecting them." 28 Another report estimates that well over a billion dollars in fines are collected each
29
year in American criminal courts.
Another criticism of fines is that they burden the poor disproportionately. This criticism is well taken with regard to the
practice of American courts. The fines imposed have been too
low to punish the wealthy and have been set without considering the offender's ability to pay. The European "day-fine" system addresses this problem. In this system the number of days
corresponds to the severity of the crime, and the per diem
amount is set in relation to the financial situation of the offender. 30 Thus the amount of punishment associated with
each day-fine sentence is neutral with respect to the wealth and
income of the offender. The United States Sentencing Commission was fully aware of the European experience with dayfines and could have adopted a similar approach in drafting the
guidelines .3
Courts also have ordered offenders to perform community
service work in lieu of prison sentences. Courts have frequently imposed community service as a sentence for white
collar criminals, but some community service programs have
targeted nonviolent street criminals. For example, in 1978 the
Vera Institute persuaded officials in the Bronx borough of New
York City to consider minor street crime offenders for a program operated by the Institute.3 2 The Institute sought a mix of
fifty percent jail bound offenders and fifty percent offenders
who would normally receive probation. The court ordered
each participant in the program to perform seventy hours of
27. Statement before the United States Sentencing Commission by Sally T.
Hillsman (July 15, 1986) [hereinafter Hillsman Statement].
28. Hillsman, supra note 26.
29. Hillsman, Mahoney, Cole & Auchter, Fines As Criminal Sanctions 1987 NAT'L
INST. OF JUST. 2 (1987).
30. Thornstedt, The Day-Fine in Sweden, Bulletin of the National Swedish Council
for Crime Prevention (Aug. 1986).
31. Hillsman Statement, supra note 27.
32. For a general description of the Vera program see D. McDONALD, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT WALLS: COMMUNITY SERVICE SENTENCES IN NEW YORK CITY (1986).
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unpaid labor. The labor ranged from maintenance work such
as mopping and waxing floors, shoveling snow and painting
walls to community development projects in the form of light
construction work on abandoned buildings slated for renovation by the city. Vera Institute project managers strictly enforced compliance with the work orders. Any offender who did
not show up for work received a warning notice, which, if unsuccessful in eliciting a positive response, was followed by initiation of resentencing proceedings. The majority of offenders
resentenced after noncompliance received jail terms.
Another effective sentencing alternative is home confinement. This option is sometimes called intensive probation or
house arrest, but regardless of the label, any sentence of this
type involves confinement of the offender to his residence during certain hours of the day. The restriction may range from
curfew during nighttime hours to total confinement outside
work or school hours. The means of enforcement also vary
greatly. Some programs utilize electronic devices to monitor
the offender's whereabouts. Others employ stepped up surveillance and more frequent unscheduled contacts by probation officers.
Several states have embraced home confinement programs,
largely in response to prison overcrowding problems. In a recent survey of innovative sentencing practices Joan Petersilia
catalogued over forty states that were operating some sort of
33
intensive probation as of January 1, 1987.

The best-known program in the country is Georgia's intensive probation supervision program. It was established in
1982 and it has served as a model for many other jurisdictions.
The Georgia plan targets prison bound, non-violent offenders
with the express goal of reducing the prison population without endangering the public. It "was designed to convince traditionally tough-minded Georgia judges that some of the
offenders they normally sent to prison could be safely man34
aged in the community."

The Georgia program assigns no more than twenty-five selected offenders to a two-person team comprised of one surveillance officer and one probation officer. Each offender is
33. J.

PETERSILIA, EXPANDING OPTIONS FOR CRIMINAL SENTENCING

12 (1987).

34. Erwin, Turning Up the Heat on Probationers in Georgia, June 1986 FED. PROBATION

17.
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expected to meet with one of the officers five times a week,
either at the probation office or in the offender's home. Some
of these contacts are scheduled and others are unannounced
curfew checks. The offender must work 132 hours in a community service program. In addition, he must be employed or
be enrolled in an educational or vocational program full-time.
Most offenders must pay a supervisory fee to cover the cost of
the surveillance, and many must subject themselves to regular
drug and alcohol tests. Finally, each offender must3 5obey a
mandatory curfew that is set by the probation officer.
The Georgia program is only one example. Other states
have created variations on the Georgia theme, and a few federal courts have initiated home confinement sentences as well.
The attractiveness of home confinement lies in its inherent
flexibility and compatibility with other types of sanctions. By
manipulating the design features of the sentence, a judge can
fulfill any or all of the purposes of sentencing that he finds relevant in the case.
Congress recognized that these alternative sanctions satisfy
the purposes of sentencing. The Senate Report clearly states
that imprisonment is not "the only form of sentence that may
effectively carry deterrent or punitive weight. It may often be
that release on probation under conditions designed to fit the
particular situation will adequately satisfy any deterrent or punitive purpose." 36 In addition, many of the conditions listed in
section 3563(b) are inherently rehabilitative in nature. Section
II of this article analyzes the relationship between purposes
7
and alternatives in greater detail.3
Moreover, the Act adopts the rule of parsimony as a guiding
principle. The Act authorizes sentences that are "sufficient,
but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes
....

"38

Apart from capital punishment, a long term of impris-

onment is the most onerous and restrictive form of punishment available in the federal system. If a sentence is to be
"sufficient but not greater than necessary," the court must
look first to other kinds of sanctions that might serve the purposes of sentencing. Section 3553(a) of the Act instructs that
35. Id.

36. SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 92.
37. See infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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"[t]he court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider ... the kinds of sentences available. ..."
In furtherance of its rule of parsimony, Congress limited the
circumstances in which a prison sentence is appropriate.
When rehabilitation is the goal, the Act directs the Commission to "insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment. ... .39
Furthermore, the Act states that nonimprisonment sentences
are generally appropriate for first offenders who have not been
convicted of "a crime of violence or an otherwise serious
0
offense."4
The picture that emerges from these provisions and their
underlying legislative history is not one that disparages imprisonment as a valid method of punishing criminals. On the
other hand, Congress did not embrace imprisonment as the
preferred sanction for the majority of offenses. In fact, the Act
prohibits probation only if (1) the offender has been convicted
of a class A or class B felony, (2) Congress has explicitly precluded probationary sentences for the offense committed, or
(3) the offender is sentenced at the same time to a term of imprisonment for the same or a similar offense. 4 ' In terms of the
guidelines matrix this would leave probation as a permissible
sentencing option in over two-thirds of the potential combinations of offense levels and criminal history scores. This compares with the less than one-sixth allowed by the guidelines.
Although sentences other than imprisonment and regular
probation have been imposed in recent years, their use is far
from routine, especially in the federal system. The Commission's empirical research method neglected the success that
such alternatives have enjoyed in individual cases. In effect,
the Commission took a snapshot of sentencing practice that
could neither capture developments in alternative sanctions
over time nor explain factors that made specific alternative
sentences effective. The Commission's study favored imprisonment sentences over less traditional ones simply because the.
newer alternatives represented a small percentage of the
sentences imposed.
The Commission made no attempt to compensate for the re39. 28 U.S.C. § 994(k).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 994(j).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a).
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suiting bias against alternative sanctions. In studying the
10,500 cases, the Commission treated probationary sentences
in a manner that actually exacerbated the statistical disparity
between imprisonment and alternative sanctions. The Commission failed to distinguish between routine, nonrestrictive
probation and the variety of more onerous nonincarcerative
sentences that exist. For instance, a suspended sentence with
two years of straight probation was deemed to be equivalent,
for the purposes of the guideline grid, to a suspended sentence
with three years of intensive probation, random drug testing,
42
strict curfews, and close surveillance.
Concededly, these distinctions are difficult to quantify, but
this does not excuse neglecting them altogether. Unfortunately, this is precisely what the Commission did in drafting
the guidelines. The guidelines authorize a sentence of probation only if the lower limit of the presumptive guideline range
is zero months, or if the lower limit is one to six months and
43
the court imposes intermittent or community confinement.
The clear message is that in the Commission's opinion, probation, regardless of its duration or conditions, is equivalent to
zero months in prison. The Commission does not acknowledge the punitive nature of restrictive probation unless the offender resides at some type of institution.
To say that two years of probation with six months of confinement to the home outside of working hours, 200 hours of
community service, and an obligation to pay restitution is
equivalent to zero months in prison distorts reality. The probationary sentence clearly has a punitive effect. However, a
court that wishes to substitute such a sentence in place of one
to seven months in prison cannot do so and remain within the
42. This assumes that the Commission used the same method for constructing
the guidelines that it used for assessing the impact of the guidelines on prison population. In its report on the latter the Commission states, "Offenders not sentenced to
imprisonment are treated as having zero months imprisonment." SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT, supra note 18, at 69 n.l.
43. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, at § 5B 1.1. In order to satisfy the requirements of a community confinement sentence, the offender must reside in a community treatment center, halfway house, or similar facility. A sentence of intermittent
confinement merely imprisons the offender for a number of days that need not be
consecutive (weekends in prison for example). In either case, the offender receives
credit only for the actual number of days spent in the institution. Id. at § 5C2. 1.
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guidelines. 44 To make matters worse, the guidelines significantly reduce the number of cases in which probation is available. According to the Commission's own estimates, the
number of defendants who will receive straight probation
under the guidelines will fall by somewhere in the range of fifteen to fifty percentage points in comparison to current
45
practice.
C.

Prison Overcrowding

According to official Bureau of Prison statistics, on April 24,
1989, the federal prison system housed 47,860 prisoners-almost 17,000 more than it was designed to hold. 46 This represents overcrowding greater than fifty percent beyond capacity,
and does not even account for the more than 6000 prisoners
housed in contract facilities. In order to cope with the flood of
prisoners, officials have placed two prisoners in cells which are
designed for only one person; converted day rooms, recreation
areas, and other common rooms into sleeping areas; and shuttled prisoners back and forth from federal facilities to already
47
overcrowded state prisons.
Overcrowded prisons disserve both the prisoners who inhabit them and the taxpayers who pay for them. Prisons are
not intended to provide comfortable, subsidized housing for
people who choose to violate the norms of society. Prisons are
and should be an effective means of punishment. However,
prisons also must be humane. At a minimum, any punishment
must avoid the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. "Conditions must not involve the
wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment.

' ' 48

No federal court has ruled that incarceration in an overcrowded prison by itself violates the Eighth Amendment. But
overcrowding often acts in concert with other conditions that,
44.

"Home detention may not be substituted for imprisonment." GUIDELINES
supra note 8, commentary to section 5C2.1.
45. Supplementary Report, supra note 18, at 68.
46. U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Monday Morning Highlights (April 24, 1989).
47. Kerr, War On Drugs Puts Strain On Prisons, U.S. Officials Say, N.Y. Times, Sept.
25, 1987, at Al, col.3; Madden, Overcrowding Pervades Prison Life in Connecticut, N.Y.
Times, March 21, 1988, at B2, col. 3.
48. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
MANUAL,
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taken as a whole, do violate prisoners' rights. Indeed, overcrowding may cause the other conditions, and it certainly contributes to the severity of their impact. In any prison, inmates
assault and abuse one another. In overcrowded prisons disruptive and violent behavior abounds.
Edwin Megargee studied population density and the frequency of disruptive behavior in the Federal Correctional Institution at Tallahassee, Florida. He found that "there is a
clear association between restrictions on personal space and
the occurrence of disruptive and aggressive behavior." 4 9 Us-

ing data from thirty-seven institutions in the Federal Prison
System, other researchers confirmed Megargee's findings. 50
Federal courts have recognized the relationship between over5
crowding and disruptive behavior as well. '

Overcrowding also challenges the capacity of a prison to
meet the basic human needs of the prisoners. In the case of
Capps v. Atiyeh 52 a federal district court described a number of
health hazards to which inmates were exposed. Prisoners
risked contraction of diseases from sleeping on the floor in
close contact with toilets. Many suffered gastric problems
caused by eating with 1400 inmates in a dining room designed
for a capacity of 440. The stress on prison facilities from such
overcrowding is enormous. Prisoners also face restricted access to whatever programs are available. For example, medical
care must be rationed to those who demonstrate the most urgent need. Prisoners must also wait months in order to participate in educational or vocational programs. Once enrolled,
inmates find their training interrupted by transfers both within
and between prisons. Additionally, the main goal of prison administrators often degenerates into crisis management. Officials necessarily worry more about where to put the neverending stream of prisoners and how to keep them under con49. See Megargee, Population Density and Disruptive Behavior in a Prison Setting, in
135, 141 (A. Cohen, G. Cole & R. Bailey eds. 1976).
50. Nacci, Prather & Teitelbaum, Population Density and Inmate Misconduct Rates in
the FederalPrison System, 41 FED. PROBATION 26, 29 (June 1977).
51. Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1977) ("There is a direct
correlation between overcrowding and violence"); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265,
1286 (S.D. Tex. 1980), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983) ("The record makes plain
the rampant violence associated with overcrowding").
52. 495 F. Supp. 802 (D. Or. 1980).
PRISON VIOLENCE
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trol and less about how to meet the prisoners' long term
needs.
If prisoners were the only constituency harmed by overcrowding, the criminal justice system might safely turn a deaf
ear to all but the most egregious of prisoner complaints. However, when inmates leave prison, the problems of prisoners inevitably become the problems of society. Strong evidence
indicates that in terms of recidivism there is a high negative
relationship between overcrowding and effectiveness. 53 In
other words, as we pack more and more offenders into prisons
ill-equipped to hold them, it becomes more likely that they will
emerge from incarceration only to resume a life of crime. The
precise causal links are unclear, but some scholars suggest
"that prisoners are more likely to become contaminated by
other prisoners in overcrowded conditions, or that it is more
difficult to attempt rehabilitative activities in overcrowded conditions, or that the experience of living in an overcrowded
54
prison produces stress and aggression."
Whatever the reasons, the effects of overcrowding on recidivism demonstrate that overburdening prisons is a dangerous
and costly practice. Perhaps sending a convicted felon to an
overcrowded prison rather than setting him free reduces the
net number of crimes committed, but other options are available. The government can construct more prisons, or courts
can sentence offenders to home confinement, intensive probation, or other nonimprisonment punishments. The tradeoffs
in terms of dollars spent and crimes committed have not been
53. The British Home Office collected statistics for 1978 in England and Wales
for the purpose of predicting recidivism. The researchers constructed a prediction
index based on criminal history, age, marital status, living arrangements, and employment history. In general, there was a close correspondence between predicted
and actual reconviction rates. David Farrington and Charles Nuttall conducted a
study in which they combined these results with statistics on prison overcrowding in
order to determine whether overcrowding influenced recidivism. The authors calculated the difference between predicted and actual reconviction rates in order to obtain an index of correctional effectiveness for each prison. They found that prisoners
from overcrowded prisons recidivated at a rate significantly greater than that predicted by the Home Office. The authors concluded that "[o]vercrowding was the
factor that was clearly negatively related to effectiveness, not size." Farrington &
Nuttall, Prison Size, Overcrowding, Prison Violence, and Recidivism, 8 J. CRIM. JUST. 221,
229 (1980); see also Farrington & Nuttall, "Overcrowding and Recidivism " A Response to
Gaes's Comment, I1J. CRIM. JUST. 269 (1983).
54. Farrington & Nuttall, supra note 53, 8 J. CRIM. JUST. at 230.
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studied adequately at this time, but the alternatives must at
least be considered.
Recognizing that the federal prison system was overburdened, Congress issued two directives to the Commission.
First, the Act obligated the Commission to "take into account
the nature and capacity of the penal, correctional, and other
facilities and services available, and . . . make recommenda-

tions concerning any change or expansion in the nature or capacity of such facilities and services that might become
necessary as a result of the guidelines...."55
Building a new prison typically costs $50,000 to $75,000 per
cell, and operating it costs an average of $14,000 per year per
inmate. 56 Considering the recent controversy over the size of
the budget deficit Congress wisely requested the Commission
to assess the resource constraints of the criminal justice system. Not surprisingly Congress issued a second directive,
seeking to limit the expenditure on new or existing prisons.
Section 994(g) requires that the guidelines "shall be formulated to minimize the likelihood that the Federal prison population will exceed the capacity of the Federal prisons."
The Commission furnished data regarding the impact of the
guidelines on the federal prison system only after the final
draft of the guidelines had been delivered to Congress. The
Commission published its findings in the Supplementary Report issued onJune 18, 1987. According to the Commission's
projections the federal prison population will increase seventyone to eighty-eight percent in the next five years, bringing the
population to an estimated 150-175 percent over today's capacity. 57 Stretching further into the future, the accuracy of the
Commission's projections becomes less certain. Nevertheless,
by 1992 the Commission projects that the federal prison population will have grown from 42,000 to between 92,000 and
118,000.
The Commission does not apologize for these results. Instead, it chooses to avoid responsibility. The Report neatly explains how the lion's share of the increase in prison population
will result from the new drug law 58 and the career-offender
55. 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (Supp. IV 1987).
56. J. Petersilia, supra note 33, at v.
57. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 18, at 62-75.
58. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-1308 (Supp. IV 1987).
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provisions of the Act. 59 Compared to the impact of these laws,
the Commission claims, the effect of the guidelines on prison
population is insignificant. The fact remains that the Commission did not minimize the likelihood that prison population
would exceed capacity. Nowhere in the Act does Congress
state or imply that the career-offender provisions or any subsequent laws would relieve the Commission of its duty to do so.
The Commission faced a difficult, but not intractable problem.
It could have issued guidelines that limited or reduced the
sentences for other crimes in order to compensate for the drug
and career-offender provisions. At a minimum the Commission could have taken steps to assure that the guidelines themselves did not aggravate prison overcrowding. Instead, the
Commission chose to formulate guidelines that increase average sentences and reduce the availability of probation, a combination guaranteed to worsen prison overcrowding.
II.

A

VISION FOR GUIDELINES MORE FAITHFUL TO THE
. OBJECTIVES OF SENTENCING REFORM

The current federal sentencing guidelines fulfill neither the
letter nor the spirit of the Sentencing Reform Act with respect
to purposes, nonimprisonment sanctions, and prison overcrowding. To a certain extent complete fulfillment of the ideals behind the Act is unattainable at this time. The guidelines
merely provide a starting point for a long process of reform.
As a starting point the current guidelines are acceptable, but in
order to advance the process of sentencing reform a vision for
the future is necessary.
The following section outlines a vision for an alternative
guideline system. It attempts to provide federal judges with a
picture of a sentencing regime located farther along the road
to the objectives of sentencing reform. This vision is offered
not as a definitive model for federal sentencing practice, but as
a stimulus both for the Commission to consider when amending the guidelines and for judges to reflect upon in formulating and explaining sentences in individual cases.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h), (i).
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A.

A Comprehensive Philosophy of Sentencing

1. A Duty to ConsiderAlternative Sanctions Before Imposing a
Term of Imprisonment
In order to attain the goals of sentencing reform the underlying philosophy of the guidelines must be redefined, and the
specific sentencing procedures of the guidelines must be restructured. On the issue of sentencing philosophy, the Commission has cited a general consensus that the ultimate aim of
the criminal justice system is crime control. 60 On the surface
the Commission's statement is correct, notwithstanding the
controversy over which of the four basic purposes of sentencing should be paramount, because each of the purposes, with
the possible exception of retribution, goes toward reducing or
controlling crime. The Commission claims that beyond crime
control the philosophical consensus breaks down. However,
two other philosophical bases exist on which there is general
agreement.
The first principle is that society is not willing to shoulder
the expense of eliminating crime at all costs, and as a result,
the criminal justice system must be aware of its resource constraints. As discussed above in the context of prison overcrowding, Congress rightfully expects an effective return on
the dollars spent on crime control. A substantial reduction in
the crime rate cannot occur without a massive transfer of financial and human resources to capture, conviction, and punishment of criminals. Even then a lasting change is unlikely. Not
even the ambitious prison building programs that the federal
government and a few states have recently launched will create
a noticeable reduction. The new prisons will be quickly filled
by the overflow from the older, crowded, deteriorating
prisons.
This state of affairs presents a dilemma for policy makers.
On the one hand, society wants to put more and more offenders in prison, but on the other hand, people do not want to pay
the taxes necessary to finance the job. The result of this nowin situation is that prison population will continue to exceed
capacity by a substantial margin. Moreover, stemming the tide
of crime would require greater expenditures in support of law
enforcement efforts to apprehend criminals. It would absorb
60.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT,

supra note 18, at 15.
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even more resources for the work of prosecutors to obtain convictions or guilty pleas. However, society demands a wide variety of other goods and services from the government ranging
from national defense to highway maintenance. Crime control
must compete with all of these for a piece of the federal
budget. In the face of these tradeoffs, Congress should not
authorize large expenditures of taxpayers' money without estimating the expected benefits beforehand.
The second principle also involves a type of cost-benefit
analysis which cannot be measured in dollars and cents. Society values individual rights and liberties and will not sacrifice
them completely-even rights and liberties of convicted
criminals-in order to control crime. The Act's requirement
that a sentence be "sufficient but not greater than necessary"
expresses this idea. Section 7.01 of the Model Penal Code also
reflects this principle. It states:
The Court shall deal with a person who has been convicted
of a crime without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the
crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that his imprisonment is neces-

sary for protection of the public

61

....

The commentary following this section states that one of its
major purposes is to insure that imprisonment sentences are
not routinely imposed. The American Law Institute argues
that, "If the court . . . begins by asking, 'Why not imprisonment?', it commences at the wrong place. Rather, subsection
(1) requires the court to approach sentencing by asking, 'Why

imprisonment?'. "62
These concerns suggest that a court should look to less restrictive and less expensive sanctions before imposing a sentence of imprisonment. Prisons absorb a large quantity of
resources, and they intrude deeply on individual rights. In a
proposal for sentencing reform, O'Donnell, Churgin, and Curtis argue that imprisonment should always be "the sentence of
last resort." 63 They do not suggest that incarceration should
rarely be employed, but "[b]efore a court may consider a
prison term of any length, it must first determine whether the
61. Model Penal Code § 7.01(1) (1985).
62. Id. at 225 (commentary).
63. P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS,

TOWARD AJUST AND EFFECTIVE SEN-

TENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
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sentencing goals in a particular case can be accomplished
through the use of probation, special probationary conditions,
and/or a fine." 64 Congress was not willing to go so far as to
require the Commission or the court to adopt this procedural
requirement, 65 but this kind of presumption would advance
the goals of the Act in general and of section 3553(a) specifically without undermining the objectives of sentencing in any
way. Therefore, my alternative guidelines system would require the court to look first to nonimprisonment sanctions. If,
however, the court determines that prison is more appropriate
than other options, the court must explain the reasons for imposing a prison sentence instead of a nonimprisonment sanction in every case where imprisonment is not mandatory.
2.

Purposes

A comprehensive guidelines philosophy also should include
a collection of principles to govern a court's determination of
when and to what extent each of the four purposes of sentencing should dictate the sentence in a particular case. The guidelines should list various offense and offender characteristics
and connect them with the appropriate purposes. Specific
sanctions should then be linked with the designated purposes.
This facially simple task becomes quite complicated in reality
because the purpose associated with any given characteristic
may change as that characteristic is combined with different
factors. For example, youth may correlate with amenability to
rehabilitation for a first time offender, but rehabilitation may
be inappropriate for young repeat offenders. Many studies
show that such offenders are highly likely to recidivate because
they are in the prime of their criminal careers. Therefore incapacitation may be a more salient concern.
Within the scope of this article it is not possible to explore
the myriad of potential offense and offender characteristics.
Such an inquiry merits extensive research and analysis. Instead, this article focuses on the purposes themselves and how
they relate to one another in the context of sentencing deci64. Id.
65. "[T]he Committee feels that the best course is to provide no presumption
either for or against probation as opposed to imprisonment, but to allow the Sentencing Commission ... and the courts, the full exercise of full discretion in tailoring
sentences to the circumstances of individual cases." SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at
91.
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sions. The analysis begins with deterrence and then proceeds
to rehabilitation, punishment, and incapacitation respectively.
a.

Deterrence

Scholars have long debated the merits of general deterrence
as a purpose of sentencing. Some critics of deterrence theory
argue that most criminals are not rational utility maximizers.
In other words, offenders do not decide whether to commit a
crime by calculating the costs and benefits. They commit
66
crimes on impulse, when need and opportunity intersect.
Other critics contend that those who do engage in a rough sort
of cost-benefit analysis operate under false or incomplete
information.67
Proponents of deterrence theory respond with studies evaluating a number of programs designed to increase the
probability and severity of punishment inflicted for specific
kinds of crime. 68 Deterrence advocates argue that every criminal need not be a rational actor and that each criminal's perceptions need not be wholly accurate. For deterrence to work
it is sufficient that some potential criminals act rationally and
69
that their perceptions are substantially correct.
On some level deterrence works. Without a police force and
a criminal justice system the crime rate would undoubtedly increase. But the important question for sentencing policy is
whether the force behind deterrence, derives more from
probability of receiving punishment or from severity of the
punishment received. If a potential criminal has a ten percent
chance of being imprisoned for a year or a five percent chance
of receiving two years of imprisonment, he should be deterred
equally by both sentences. After all, the expected cost of committing a crime is the same in each scenario-.10 years in
prison. Both conventional wisdom and empirical studies disprove this hypothesis. 70 Offenders respond much more readily
66. Jacob, Rationality and Criminality, 59 SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 584 (1979).
67. Id.
68. See Chaiken, Lawless & Stevenson, The Impact of Police Activity on Subway Crime,
3 URB. ANALYSIS 173 (1974); Ross, Law, Science, andAccidents: The British Road Safety Act
of 1967, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1973); Ross, Deterrence Regained: The Cheshire Constabulary's
"BreathalizerBlitz", 6J. LEGAL STUD. 241 (1977); G. PIERCE & W. BOWERS, THE IMPACT
OF THE BARTLEY-Fox GUN LAW ON CRIME IN MASSACHUSETTS (1979).
69. Cook, Research in CriminalDeterrence: Laying the Groundworkfor the Second Decade,
2 CRIME &JUsT. 211, 226-27 (N. Morris & M. Tonry eds. 1980).
70. Id. at 230-32.
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to policies that increase the likelihood of arrest, conviction,
and punishment than to policies that make the punishments
more severe.
Consideration of marginal changes in crime control policy
should govern deterrence analysis in specific cases. When the
goal is greater deterrence more resources should be devoted
to increasing the certainty of punishments because incremental
changes in the severity of sanctions will not substantially bolster the deterrent effect. Adequate deterrence can be achieved
through sentences that serve the other three purposes of sentencing, especially retribution. If a sentence is sufficiently onerous to satisfy the requirements of just punishments, then it
also should serve deterrent purposes.
In unusual circumstances, increasing the severity of punishment may affect deterrence significantly. However, a court
should embark on this course with caution because "[i]f we try
to improve on deterrence by sharply increasing the severity of
sentences, and we are wrong, then we may spend a great deal
of money and unnecessarily blight the lives of offenders who
could safely be punished for shorter periods of time." 7' The
Senate Report suggests two scenarios in which the calculated
risks may be warranted. The first involves popular or trendy
crimes. The Report states that "during a period in which the
incidence of a particular kind of crime is increasing rapidly, it
may be entirely appropriate for the court to give paramount
emphasis to the deterrent purpose of sentencing." 72 The Report also states that deterrence "is particularly important in
the area of white collar crime" because white collar criminals
receive lenient sentences and can write off sentences as a cost
of doing business. 73 In both situations tougher sentences, as
well as stricter enforcement, may be necessary to shock the offenders into awareness that these types of criminals not only
get caught, but that they receive serious punishment as well.
b.

Rehabilitation

In the pre-guidelines system, the purpose of rehabilitation
was the driving force in correctional policy. Criminologists
and social scientists placed great faith in counseling and train71. J.
72.

WILSON,

THINKING ABOUT CRIME 144 (rev. ed. 1983).

SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 92.

73. Id. at 76.
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ing programs designed to reform offenders, believing that virtually anyone could be cured of his criminal tendencies as long
as the appropriate programs were used. Policy makers also accepted the rehabilitative ideal and granted broad discretion
and authority to specialists in the field. Numerous legislatures
adopted indeterminate sentencing policies with the understanding that someone would ultimately pronounce the offender rehabilitated and terminate the sentence. Under
standard operating procedures the judge would sentence the
offender "to the care and custody of the department of corrections until such time as he is rehabilitated."
From the day of sentencing until the time of release, the offender received few if any clues regarding the probable termination date for his punishment. Nor did anyone explain to the
offender how he was expected to demonstrate successful rehabilitation. Parole boards commonly gave no reasons for denying parole, and when they did, the reasons given rarely
reflected any coherent rationale. This state of affairs fostered
tension and anxiety among offenders and actually impeded
rehabilitation.
Beginning with a study by Robert Martinson in 1974, a flood
of criticism rained upon the rehabilitative ideal and on indeterminate sentencing in particular. After studying over 200 efforts to evaluate rehabilitative programs Martinson concluded,
"With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts
that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect
on recidivism." 74 The United States National Academy of Sciences Panel on Research on Rehabilitative Techniques conducted the most recent comprehensive study of this issue and
essentially reinforced Martinson's general conclusion. The
Panel, however, stopped short of abandoning the rehabilitative
ideal. Instead, the Panel suggested that while present knowledge provides no basis for positive recommendations about
techniques to rehabilitate offenders, "[t]he strongest recommendation that can be made at the present time is that research on ways of rehabilitating offenders be pursued more
vigorously, more systematically, more imaginatively, and cer75
tainly more rigorously."

74.

Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 1974 THE
22, 25.
U.S. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PANEL ON RESEARCH ON REHABILITATIVE

PUBLIC INTEREST

75.
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Proponents of rehabilitation theory highlight the flaws in
many of the studies criticizing rehabilitation programs. James
Q. Wilson argues, "Though the evaluators of rehabilitation
programs typically speak of 'recidivism rates,' in fact they do
not mean 'rate' at all; they mean 'percent who fail.' "76 A typical study of this sort would equate rearrests occurring one
week after termination of the program with rearrests effected
two years later. Both offenders would be "failures" as long as
the rearrest occurred within the study period. Moreover, each
study used a different measure of failure, ranging from technical violations of probation (such as failing to report to the probation officer as scheduled) to reconviction and imprisonment.
Because of these two ambiguities many of the studies ignored any potential decline in the frequency of an offender's
criminal behavior. In order to be a "success" the offender
must have quit his life of crime cold turkey-slowdowns did
not count. Wilson contrasts a study of rehabilitation by
Charles A. Murray and Louis A. Cox, Jr. in which the authors
attempted to remedy this problem. They found that the "failure rate" of their sample of juvenile delinquents was high-82
percent rearrested. However, the arrest rate for these hard
core delinquents had actually declined from 6.3 per year
77
before being sent away to 2.9 per year after release.
Other scholars have argued that certain individuals are more
amenable to rehabilitative treatment programs than others and
that it is inaccurate to gauge the success of rehabilitation using
aggregate data. In a 1961 California study Stuart Adams
found that "bright, verbal, and anxious" juveniles were most
amenable to treatment. 78 After reviewing the more recent
evaluative studies on juvenile offenders, Daniel Glaser reached
similar conclusions. He found that anxious, neurotic, guiltstricken offenders benefited from intensive counseling. 79
The United States National Academy of Sciences Research
Panel report briefly addressed the concept of amenability and
TECHNIQUES, The Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders: Problems and Prospects 10 (L.
Sechrest, S. White & E. Brown eds. 1979) [hereinafter PANEL REPORT].
76. J. WILSON, supra note 71, at 171.
77. Id. at 172.
78. Adams, The PICO Project, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT AND CORRECTION
213-14 (N. Johnston, L. Savitz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1962).
79. Glaser, Remedies for the Deficiency in CriminalJustice Evaluation Research, I IJ.
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 144 (1974).
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stated that evidence was lacking to draw any significant conclusions. The Panel found that amenability had not been rigorously defined and that the studies had been conducted with
insufficient methodological controls.80 Again, these findings
emphasize that definitive answers are lacking in the area of rehabilitation. Many scholars would like the criminal justice system to throw up its hands in frustration and forget about
rehabilitation. But no one has proved that nothing works or
that nothing can work. All one can say with certainty at this
point is that nobody has proved that something specific does
work.
In the legislative history of the Act, Congress acknowledged
disillusionment with rehabilitation and rejected the rehabilitation model as the sole basis for sentencing policy. 8 1 On the
other hand, Congress did not abandon rehabilitation as a valid
sentencing purpose. Both section 3553(a)(2)(D) and the Senate Report make it clear that "the Committee has retained rehabilitation and corrections as an appropriate purpose of a
,"82
sentence ..
Congress acted wisely in refusing to eliminate rehabilitation
from the philosophical foundation for the guidelines. All that
can be gleaned from the dearth of good information on rehabilitation is that rehabilitation should stand on an equal footing with the other purposes, instead of occupying a position of
prominence over them. Courts should continue to assess
whether offenders are amenable to treatment, focusing on
those groups of offenders who are plagued by specific, treatable problems (such as drug and alcohol addiction) and who
have not failed repeatedly in previous rehabilitative programs.
In addition, some new programs have shown promising results in preliminary evaluations. Often they involve a great
deal of structure and discipline in the life of the offender on
the outside. This contradicts the common notion that rehabilitation refers to interventions in the offender's life that are benevolent and include the provision of services. Yet there is no
reason for rehabilitation to be categorized so narrowly. As
Wilson notes, "Rehabilitation can (and usually does) involve a
80. PANEL REPORT, supra note 75, at 43-46.
81. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 40.
82. Id. at 76.
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substantial degree of coercion, even of intimidation . . 83
The rehabilitative effect of such programs will be described in
detail below. Some of the more basic components of rehabilitation are restitution, intensive probation supervision, and
community service.
c. Retribution
As support for rehabilitation has declined the purpose of
retribution or just punishment has assumed a position of
prominence. Andrew von Hirsch, a leading proponent of the
retributive model of sentencing, argues that punishment is
conceptually distinct from the other three purposes because it
does not purport to serve the utilitarian goal of crime control.
He contends that the principle of just punishment views crime
retrospectively in an attempt to determine precisely the
amount of punishment that a particular offender "deserves"
based on the seriousness of the crime. Von Hirsch explains
that "''[s]eriousness' depends both on the harm done (or
risked) by the act and on the degree of the actor's
culpability."84

Von Hirsch's theory contradicts the Commission's "general
consensus" that crime control is the ultimate aim of the criminal justice system. Perhaps von Hirsch overstates his case
when he argues that the objective of retribution is not crime
control. Punishment influences notions of right and wrong in
society, and this signalling function may foster respect for legal
norms. Nevertheless, von Hirsch correctly isolates retribution
as a distinct and important goal of the criminal law. Retribution certainly has ancient roots. Judaic law required proportionality: "life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for
hand, foot for foot." 85The principle that the gravity of the punishment should be commensurate with the seriousness of the
crime has remained prominent in the language of sentencing.
Many countries and states have incorporated it into their criminal law and constitutions. 86 However, the rigor with which authorities apply the principle in individual cases has softened
over time. We no longer sanction torture or corporal punish83. J. WILSON, supra note 71, at 173.
84.

A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 69 (1976).

85. Deuteronomy 19:21 (New American Standard Version).
86. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 84, at 67.
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ment to compensate for assault and battery, and rarely do we
require that a life be taken for a life.
Once the concrete reference points have been removed, it is
difficult to justify any absolute scale of punishments. Any level
of punishment imposed is inherently subjective because "we
lack the moral calipers to say with precision of a given punishment 'that was a just punishment.' "87 We encounter less difficulty conceptualizing the appropriate quantity of punishment
in relative terms. Murder merits greater punishment than burglary, and armed robbery is more serious than shoplifting. But
ranking crimes necessarily involves subtle discernment of harm
to the victim and culpability of the offender. Is rape worse
than kidnapping? How about possession of drugs versus theft?
H.L.A. Hart identifies this problem in his book, Punishmentand
Responsibility. He argues that any scale of gravity of offenses
no doubt consists of very broad judgments both of relative
moral iniquity and harmfulness of different types of offence:
it draws rough distinctions like that between parking offenses and homicide, or between "mercy killing" and murder for gain, but cannot cope with any precise assessment
of
88
an individual's wickedness in committing a crime.
The difficulties inherent in formulating a sentence that satisfies the requirements of retribution have led Norval Morris to
modify von Hirsch's notion of just deserts. Morris contends
that "a deserved punishment must mean a not undeserved
punishment which bears a proportional relationship in the hierarchy of punishments to the harm for which the criminal has
been convicted." 8 9 In other words, for any given crime a range
of punishments is appropriate for retributive purposes. Within
the range of punishments bounded by just deserts the other
purposes of sentencing interact to fix the specific sentence. Or
as Morris puts it, "Desert justifies and limits eligibility for
punishment; desert and utility combine to distribute
punishments."90

Von Hirsch rejects Morris' modification and clings to the notion that it is unjust to impose different absolute penalties on
87. Morris & Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, in 6 CRIME AND JUSTICE 1, 37 (M.
Tonry & N. Morris eds. 1985).
88. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 25 (1968).
89. N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 150 (1982) (Morris' theory of
retribution in sentencing is in the context of the mentally ill criminal).
90. Id. at 149.
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equally deserving offenders. 9' Von Hirsch's argument is ultimately unpersuasive because he does not explain how one determines with precision which offenders are equally deserving,
nor does he explain the manner by which one arrives at the
absolute level of punishment that is "just."
Congress did not explain whether the just punishment embodied in the Sentencing Reform Act referred to specific
points on a scale of punishment or to a range of punishments.
Congress merely listed it with the other purposes to be considered, and in the Senate Report stated that just punishment
"should be reflected clearly in all sentences." 9 2 Serious offenders must not get off easy while petty offenders receive long
prison terms, but the inherent subjectivity involved in assigning punishments that are "just" requires that the purpose
of retribution act only as a limiting principle on sentencing. As
long as the sentence falls within the range of not unjustified
punishments, concern for rehabilitation and incapacitation
should dictate the specific terms of the sentence.
d.

Incapacitation

As a theoretical matter incapacitation generally sparks less
controversy among scholars because, as Wilson notes, incapacitation "works by definition." 9 3 Three assumptions undergird
that definition: (1) some offenders would commit crimes after
conviction; (2) incapacitated offenders are not immediately replaced by new criminal recruits; and (3) offenders do not commit an inordinately high number of crimes after release so as to
make up for the crimes not committed while incapacitated.
Wilson contends not only that these propositions are plausible, but that the available empirical data supports their validity
as well.
The more difficult question is how to make incapacitation
work most effectively. Locking up all offenders for long periods of time may lower the crime rate, but the cost of such a
sentencing policy would be prohibitive. Studies have shown
that a small percentage of offenders account for a large percentage of crimes.94 Therefore, a more efficient course of ac91.
92.
93.
94.

See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 84, at 73-74.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 75.
J. WILSON, supra note 71, at 145.
See, e.g., M. PETERSON, H. BRAIKER & S. POLICH, WHO COMMITS CRIMES
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tion would be to selectively incapacitate high-rate offenders
more often and longer than low-rate offenders.
Three major studies on selective incapacitation have attempted to isolate factors that are predictive of recidivism. Using data from offenders arrested in Washington, D.C., Kristen
Williams of the Institute for Law and Social Research (INSLAW) identified twenty-one variables that correlated either
positively or negatively with recidivism. She categorized them
into three groups-factors related to the current arrest, characteristics of the offender's criminal record, and social and personal factors. 95 A later study by Peter Greenwood of the Rand
Corporation found seven factors highly probative in the identification of high rate offenders. An offender is more likely to
recidivate if (1) he was convicted as a juvenile, (2) he used illegal drugs as a juvenile, (3) he used drugs in the previous two
years, (4) he was employed less than fifty percent of the time in
the last two years, (5) he served time in a juvenile facility, (6)
he was incarcerated for more than fifty percent of the last two
years, and (7) he was previously convicted of the same offense. 96 Greenwood was able to predict low-rate offenders
with eighty-two percent accuracy but had more difficulty distinguishing between moderate and high-rate offenders. A study
by William Rhodes at INSLAW claimed even greater accuracy.
It found that high-rate offenders are likely to be relatively
young, heroin and alcohol abusers, who started committing
crimes at an early age, who have served a long prison term,
and whose present offense involves violence. Using these criteria Rhodes predicted which of the individuals would become
career criminals. After five years eighty-five percent of those
predicted to be career criminals were in fact rearrested for serious crimes, while only thirty-six percent of those not predicted
97
to be high rate offenders were rearrested.
Critics raise two main objections to selective incapacitation.
First, they argue that sentencing decisions based on predictions of dangerousness and recidivism create a risk that some
186-88 (1981); K.

WILLIAMS

&J.

LUCIANOVIC, ROBBERY AND BURGLARY:

A

STUDY OF

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERSONS ARRESTED AND THE HANDLING OF THEIR CASES

22-29 (1979).
95. K. WILLIAMS, THE SCOPE AND PREDICTION OF RECIDIVISM 19 (1979).
96. P. GREENWOOD, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (1982).
97. W. RHODES, DEVELOPING CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING CAREER CRIMINALS 44
(1982).

IN COURT
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offenders who do not in fact pose a threat to society will be
punished too severely. Each model inevitably yields a certain
number of these "false positives." The critics of selective incapacitation contend that this number will always be too high,
and therefore predictions of dangerousness and recidivism do
not provide a reliable basis for imposing punishments. The
second objection is that even if judges can make these predictions with great accuracy, the method of making the predictions involves consideration of conduct or status not directly
related to the offense of conviction.
These criticisms miss the mark because they are grounded in
invalid assumptions. They implicitly embrace the contention
of von Hirsch that each offense carries with it a discrete
amount of punishment that is "just." As indicated above, any
sentencing body at best can agree only on a range of not unjust
punishments for a particular offense. Small variations in quantity of punishment within the range may be justified. 98 Assuming that agreement can be reached on a range of just
punishments for a particular crime, a judge must find a principled basis for sentencing within that range. The utilitarian
goals embodied in the notion of selective incapacitation can
help here. A judge may determine that a high-rate burglar
merits a four year term in prison while a low-rate burglar warrants only three years. If the range ofjust punishments is three
to four years, then the judge has not violated notions of fairness and justice. On the contrary, he has merely followed explicit rules for choosing a sentence rather than using some
other, perhaps more arbitrary, means of deciding.
Furthermore, criticisms of selective incapacitation erroneously assume that incapacitative sentences are necessarily
more punitive than sentences not involving incapacitation.
Under the current sentencing regime this may be true, but
nonincapacitative sentences need not be lenient. Fines, restitution, and community service sentences do not involve incapacitation, yet each of these sanctions is punitive to some
degree. A combination of these sanctions could be more oner98. A sentencing regime based purely on the principle of selective incapacitation
might allow large variations, sentencing high-rate offenders to long terms of imprisonment and letting low-rate offenders avoid any sort of restrictive sentence. Since
such a system would clearly violate the concept of just deserts, I do not consider it
here.
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ous from the offender's perspective than a short incarcerative
sentence.
3. A Spectrum of Sanctions
A comprehensive sentencing philosophy also should provide
guidance for translating the purposes found relevant in each
case into concrete sanctions. Since the federal sentencing
guidelines do not address purposes adequately, it is not surprising that they fail at this task as well. For example, where
probation is permitted within the guidelines matrix the Commission gives no counsel to ajudge in choosing probation over
imprisonment or in designating the conditions associated with
the probationary sentence, if chosen. The guidelines merely
list the types of conditions that are allowed.
One of the cornerstones of the sentencing philosophy proposed in this article is parsimony-not burdening the offender
or society any more than is necessary to achieve the relevant
purposes of sentencing. Given this concern, a judge must understand the ways in which the various types of sentences serve
each of the four purposes and must appreciate the costs associated with each sanction. The links between purposes and types
of sentences deserve far more attention than can be provided
within the confines of this article, but the following discussion
of fines, restitution, community service, home confinement,
and imprisonment illustrates the type of analysis that is
required.
Fines are a popular sanction for several reasons. First, they
can serve both as meaningful punishments and effective deterrents. A court can adjust the amount of the fine in relation to
the offender's resources and thereby insure that the wealthy
and the poor do not bear unequal burdens. In addition, a fine
does not destroy the offender's chance to receive needed training, treatment, and education; nor does it disrupt the offender's home or work life severely. Finally, fines lessen the
cost borne by the criminal justice system for supervising offenders on probation or keeping inmates in custody.
Under the Sentencing Reform Act the maximum fines have
been increased substantially. Any felony offender may now be
fined up to $250,000. Thus, the heavy fines now available reinforce the notion that "a fine may often be a highly useful
means of providing just punishment and deterring others from
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss3/4
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engaging in like offenses." 9 9 While recognizing the punitive
effect of a fine, Congress did not seek merely to intensify the
onerousness of criminal penalties. Instead, it authorized
courts to "permit the imposition of a substantial fine in lieu of
part or all of a prison term in appropriate cases."' 00
Section 3572 of the Act lists several factors for a court to
consider in determining whether to impose a fine. The court's
point of departure must be based upon "the factors set forth in
section 3553(a)," a provision whose main concern is the purposes of sentencing. The court also must take into account all
of the offender's background characteristics, including ability
to pay, the burden that the fine will impose on the offender
and his dependents, any restitution made to the victim, and
any other pertinent considerations. Applying these principles,
a sentencing judge would first decide whether a fine is warranted and then set the amount high enough to punish and
deter the offender but not so high that it would undermine
whatever rehabilitative effect the sentence as a whole is intended to carry.
The guidelines invert this inquiry by making fines mandatory
in all cases unless the defendant establishes that he is unable to
pay the fine or that the fine is unduly burdensome. 10 The
question thus becomes whether not to impose a fine. Moreover, under the guidelines the answer may not be influenced
by the already punitive nature of the sentence, such as five
years in prison plus a fine. Only in setting the amount of the
fine may the court consider the degree to which the combined
10 2
sentence provides adequate punishment and deterrence.
The guidelines' presumption in favor of fines in all cases is
unwarranted. A fine should be a component of a sentence only
in cases where an extra measure of deterrence or punishment
is merited. If an offender receives a prison sentence, a fine is
not appropriate unless it serves to reduce the term of imprisonment dictated by just deserts. On the other hand, a fine may
dovetail nicely with a sentence of straight probation that might
otherwise be perceived as too lenient.
Sentences requiring offenders to pay restitution to their vic99.
100.
101.
102.

SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 107.
Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, at §§ 5E4.2(a), (f).
Id. at § 5E4.2(d).
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tins deter and punish in the same manner as fines. The extent
of the punishment depends on the amount of restitution involved. Some proponents claim that restitution has a rehabilitative effect on criminals as well. An offender who is forced to
repay his victim either with money or in-kind service must confront the consequences of his criminal act. This type of encounter may be therapeutic because it helps the offender to
appreciate the nature of his crime and to take responsibility for
it. 103

Congress heavily favored restitution in the Act. Section
3553(a)(7) requires the court in each sentencing decision to
consider "the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense." If the court chooses not to order restitution, section
3553(c) requires the judge to state his reasons. The guidelines
04
faithfully implement the intent of Congress here.1
The potential rehabilitative effect on the offender and the
compensatory result for the victim justify the presumption in
favor of restitution. A sentence of restitution, however, poses
problems similar to those discussed above with reference to
fines. A sentence comprised of restitution and other punitive
elements may inadvertently exceed the requirements of just
deserts unless the punitive effect of restitution is taken into account. There is a real danger that the court may decide that
five years in prison is warranted by just deserts and then order
$10,000 restitution merely to compensate the victim. Certainly this helps to make the victim whole, but it also boosts the
level of punishment. Apart from this potential problem, the
increased use of restitution mandated by the Act and the
guidelines is a positive development. Such sentences may deter, punish, and possibly rehabilitate the offender.
Many indigent offenders do not have the resources or the
ability to pay fines or restitution. Other wealthy offenders can
make large payments without suffering greatly. For these offenders especially, as well as some in between, community service may be a more effective sentence. Advocates of
community service justify its use on a number of grounds.
Some see it as restitution to society at large and point to the
103. Casson, Restitution:An Economically and Socially DesirableApproach to Sentencing, 9
N.E. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 354 (1983). But see D. McDONALD, supra note
32, at 165.
104. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, at § 5E4.1 and commentary.
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benefits both to community and offender.10 5 Others emphasize that forcing an offender to provide unpaid labor restricts
his liberty, and therefore both punishes and deters. In the
Vera Institute program in New York City "[t]he community
10 6
service sentence was to be first and foremost a punishment."
The perceptions of the offenders sentenced to the Vera Institute program varied. Some viewed their sentences as not punitive in comparison to jail sentences and felt that they were
getting a break. Others perceived their sentences as serious
punishments. A study of the program concluded that, on the
whole, offenders perceived a community service sentence to be
less desirable than a small fine or unconditional discharge and
that the community service sentences were punitive to some
degree. 107
The guidelines allow the court to require community service
as a condition of probation or supervised release. However,
the guidelines shed little light on when such a condition is warranted. Section 5F5.3 of the guidelines obligates the court in
felony cases to impose one or more of the following: a fine,
restitution, or community service. The guidelines leave two
questions unanswered with respect to these conditions. Why is
the court obligated to impose at least one condition in all felony cases? And how is a court to decide which conditions are
appropriate?
A fair interpretation of section 3563(b) of the Act indicates
that Congress expected an answer to these questions. In this
provision Congress empowered the courts to impose a number
of discretionary conditions upon a probationary sentence, including fines, restitution, and community service. However,
section 3563(b) limits the court's discretion "to the extent that
such conditions are reasonably related to the factors set forth
in section 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2) and to the extent that such
conditions involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary for the purposes indicated in
section 3553(a)(2)." Section 5F5.3 of the guidelines implies
that a sentence of felony probation standing alone is not sufficiently onerous to provide adequate deterrence and just pun105. See Perrier & Pink, Community Service: All Things to All People, June 1985 FED.
PROBATION 32, 37 (discussion of community service and rehabilitation).

106. D.

McDONALD, supra note

32, at 45.

107. Id. at 163.
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ishment, but neither the guidelines nor the Commission's
commentary compel such a reading. Where there is a conflict
the court is bound to follow section 3563 of the Act, not section 5F5.3 of the guidelines. Each element of the sentence
must be justified independently. Therefore, whenever the purposes of section 3553(a)(2) are met by the other aspects of the
sentence, such as prison or probation, additional conditions
are unwarranted.
The final nonimprisonment sanction discussed in this article
is home confinement. As the restrictions of the Georgia program demonstrate, home confinement can pack strong punitive and deterrent effects. 10s A recent study conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center found that offenders perceive home
confinement programs to be extremely punitive. In fact, some
offenders "have refused to participate in home confinement
programs, once they learned of the strict rules, because they
felt it would be easier to spend the time in jail."'109

Data on the incapacitation effects of home confinement is
sparse at this time. However, the strength of the incapacitative
effect sureiy is dependent on the restrictiveness of the conditions imposed. Close electronic monitoring or probation officer check-ups can insure that the offender will not have free
rein in the streets. Joan Petersilia reports that a program in
Palm Beach, Florida, in which more than sixty percent of the
participants were felons, was a "resounding success in this respect." Only three percent of the offenders in the program
escaped or were rearrested during their term of home confinement.110 In addition, any violation of probationary conditions
could be strictly enforced with more restrictive terms or even
incarceration.
The Federal Judicial Center study reports that home confinement also may hold great promise as a rehabilitative tool.
"[O]ffenders can learn to structure their time, budget their
money, and generally make significant changes in their habits
under the enforced regime of home confinement."' l Meanwhile, job responsibilities and attention to the needs of the of108. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
109. Federal Judicial Center, Home Confinement: An Evolving Sanction in the Federal

CriminalJutice System 46 (1987) [hereinafter Federal Judicial Center Study].
110. J.

111.

PETERSILIA,

supra note 33, at 44-45.

Federal Judicial Center Study, supra note 109, at 51.
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fender's family need not be seriously disrupted. At this time
the rehabilitative effects of home confinement can only be
measured by anecdotal evidence. Stories of changed lives
abound, but until empirical data can be gathered a conclusion
that home confinement is the great hope for the rehabilitative
ideal is premature.
The guidelines allow for home confinement, but only as a
condition of probation or supervised release. ' 2 They explicitly reject home confinement as a substitute for imprisonment.
As discussed, the guidelines narrowly restrict probation to
cases in which the lower limit of the guidelines, sentencing
range is six months or less. Within this category of cases a
judge may order home confinement only if the lower limit is
zero months." 3 This scheme implies that the punishment
value associated with home confinement is zero. Thus a sentence of probation with six months of home confinement
would be considered zero months of punishment within the
guidelines matrix.
Once again the guidelines unduly limit the court's discretion
to take advantage of a promising alternative sanction. As with
the other alternatives, the guidelines fail to account for the punitive effect of home confinement. Moreover, the guidelines
do not recognize home confinement as a credible incapacitative sentence. The guidelines remove the primary incentive
that would motivate a federal court to impose home confinement. States consider home confinement attractive largely because it diverts offenders otherwise bound for prison, but the
guidelines prohibit the use of home confinement as a substitute for prison. Home confinement is not a panacea, but many
states have invested in home confinement programs that hold
great potential for meeting the objectives of sentencing. In the
federal system, however, home confinement has been robbed
of its lifeblood. The Federal Judicial Center study observes
that "the Sentencing Commission has prematurely restricted
the use of home confinement."'4 The study recommends that
the Commission reintroduce home confinement as an alternative to imprisonment. In order to act on this recommendation
the Commission need only amend the guidelines to allow
112. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, at § 5F5.2 and commentary.
113. See supra note 43.
114. Federal judicial Center Study, supra note 109, at 69.
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home confinement to be substituted for imprisonment, or in
the alternative the Commission could expand the definition of
community confinement to include home confinement.
Nonimprisonment sanctions obviously serve a variety of purposes at a reasonable cost, but under the guidelines imprisonment remains the preferred punishment. Why is this? What
purposes does prison serve? The answers here are straightforward. Prison keeps convicted criminals off the streets. Prison
punishes offenders severely. And to the extent that punishment discourages crime, prison is a deterrent. Prison does
not, however, rehabilitate. All studies of prison rehabilitation
programs agree on this, and Congress has explicitly disapproved of using imprisonment as a rehabilitative sanction.,

15

Nevertheless, incarceration is an appropriate sentence for
many offenders, and it should be maintained as a sentence for
the most dangerous or recalcitrant offenders. This conclusion
does not contradict the underlying principle that the guidelines should treat imprisonment as a sentence of last resort. A
court should give an imprisonment sentence serious consideration, but should choose to incarcerate the offender only if the
objectives of sentencing cannot be achieved effectively by a
combination of other sanctions.
B.

Guideline Structure Must Reflect the Comprehensive Philosophy

A coherent philosophy is the cornerstone of any sound sentencing regime. Without it, sentencing practice may be internally consistent, and sentencing outcomes may still be
consistently bad. However, the structure of the sentencing system is nearly as important as its foundation. Poorly designed
procedures may skew the sentencing analysis and undermine
the court's ability to arrive at the appropriate sentence.
Apart from the provisions of the guidelines that allow a
court to depart, the guideline procedures suffer from such a
design flaw. 16 A well-intentioned judge may fully comply with
115. 28 U.S.C. § 994(k).
116. Certainly the departure provisions are an integral part of the guidelines, but
the Commission's position is that departures will occur only in unusual circumstances. "[T]he Commission believes that despite the courts' legal freedom to depart
from the guidelines, they will not do so very often." GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note
8, at Introduction p. 1.7. Therefore, it does not distort the issue to analyze the
guideline sentencing process as an initial matter without considering departures. Departures are addressed in section III below.
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the procedures of the guidelines without getting a sense of
who the offender is and what his needs are. A step-by-step
walking tour through the guidelines will illustrate this point.
The first stop is the offense itself. The court must make a finding of fact regarding the events surrounding the crime itself
and then calculate the offense level. Next the court must consider victim related adjustments. Was the victim vulnerable?
Was he a government official? Did the offender physically restrain the victim? An affirmative finding here raises the offense
level.'1 7 The third step evaluates the role of the offender. Was
he an organizer or leader or merely a minor participant? Did
he abuse a position of trust? Again, the court may adjust the
offense level.' 18 Fourth, did the offender impede or obstruct,
or attempt to impede or obstruct, investigation or prosecution
of the case?" 9 The final inquiry regarding the offense is
whether the offender demonstrably accepted responsibility for
0

his actions. 12

The next phase, calculation of criminal history category,
purports to satisfy the court's obligation under section
3553(a)(1) of the Act to consider "the history and characteristics of the defendant." Under guideline section 4Al the
court adds up points for the prior convictions and sentences
that are reflected in the offender's criminal record. The seriousness and recency of the prior sentences imposed affects the
point total. On the basis of these points the guidelines place
the offender into one of six criminal history categories. The
offender's record may further influence his sentence if it qualifies him for career offender status' 2' or shows that the current
offense is part of a pattern of conduct from which the offender
made a livelihood. 122 In either case the guidelines set a minimum floor for punishment and in addition raise the maximum
punishment allowable for the offense level. The only step remaining is to consult the grid, find the range associated with
the offense level and criminal history category, and then
choose a point within the range.
The court need not do anything beyond what has just been
117. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, at § 3A1.1-3.
* 118. Id. at §§ 3B1.1-3.
119. Id. at § 3C1.1.
120. Id. at § 3E1.1.
121. Id. at §§ 4B1.1-2.
122. Id. at § 4B1.3.
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described in order to comply fully with the guidelines. Nowhere in this process has the judge been compelled to acknowledge the humanity of the offender or to seek an
understanding of the causes behind the criminal conduct. In
fact, the Commission attempts to eliminate from consideration
many highly probative characteristics such as age, education,
vocational skills, mental, emotional, and physical condition,
drug or alcohol dependence, employment record, family ties
and responsibilities, and community ties. Through policy
statements the Commission deems them all "not ordinarily, relevant" to sentencing.

23

The legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act demonstrates that this is not the kind of system that Congress had in
mind. "The Committee does not intend that the guidelines be
imposed in a mechanistic fashion.... The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the
fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual
offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences."' 124 The Senate Report emphasizes that the
structure of the guidelines is intended to aid the judge in formulating a sentence. The structure should not limit the
judge's thoughtful consideration of all relevant factors.
The terms of the Act strongly imply that at least some of the
factors listed above are relevant to sentencing. Section 994(d)
bound the Commission to consider each of them and "to take
them into account only to the extent that they do have relevance." The Act does cite the "general inappropriateness" of
considering several of these factors "in recommending a term
of imprisonment or length of a term of imprisonment,"' 25 but
no provision states or implies that these factors are not relevant to sentencing at all. On the contrary, the Senate Report
indicates that "each of these factors may play other roles in the
sentencing decision; they may, in an appropriate case, call for
the use of a term of probation instead of imprisonment...., 126
In order to be faithful to congressional intent, guideline structure therefore must be sufficiently open-ended to give the
judge room to consider all relevant factors. He can then im123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at §§ 5H1.1-6.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 52.
28 U.S.C. § 994(e)(Supp. IV 1986).
SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 174.
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pose a sentence upon a human offender rather than on a set of
statistics.
A few small changes in the guidelines sentencing process
could solve this problem. As it stands now the end-product of
the guidelines' numerical calculations is a presumptive prison
sentence. For each pair of offense level and criminal history
category the guidelines matrix assigns a range of months of
imprisonment. This time interval presumptive prison sentence
immediately influences the thought process of the judge. If it
seems reasonable, the judge may accept it outright. If it seems
unreasonable, the judge may exercise his discretion to raise or
lower the sentence. But where do purposes come in? What
about nonimprisonment sanctions? The judge need not ever
consider them, and he probably will not consider them unless
he has been exposed to them and supports them as alternatives
to incarceration.
Whether the current guidelines system establishes the
proper quantity of punishment is open to question. But even if
the guidelines yield the proper quantity, the result of the
guidelines calculus is still flawed. The shortcoming is that the
quantity of punishment is expressed in terms of months in
prison. This short-circuits the judge's thoughtful consideration of alternatives. It implies that the offender belongs in
prison. A solution to the problem would be to replace the
ranges of months with sanction units. For example, 0-1
months could equal one sanction unit, and 0-2 months would
equal two sanction units. The entire grid could be converted
so that no preference for a particular sentence is expressed.
Although this change is simple, it is not insignificant. Paul
Robinson, the only dissenting member of the Sentencing Commission, has suggested that the guidelines matrix be replaced
with a step-by-step process that quantifies punishments into
sanction units. 27 Under this kind of system a judge looking at
the presentence report and guidelines calculations completed
by the probation officer will see the details of the offense, the
characteristics of the offender, and the presumptive sanction
value. He will not be influenced by a presumptive sentence.
On this basis he must apply the principles discussed above in
127. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1, 26-27
(1987).
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relation to purposes and alternatives and then must decide
which kind of sanctions are appropriate and in what measure.
A hypothetical case may help to illustrate this process. Suppose that John Doe, a thirty-year-old male, is convicted for
passing counterfeit government securities in the amount of five
thousand dollars. Mr. Doe has two prior convictions. Five
years ago he received a sentence of two years probation for
larceny, and two years ago he served a sentence of thirty days
in jail for tax evasion of ten thousand dollars. Mr. Doe's
presentence investigation report reveals that he graduated
from high school and attended a vocational school for one
year. During the past ten years he has worked on and off as a
carpenter, the last four years as an independent contractor.
Mr. Doe was divorced five years ago and has custody of two
children, ages six and eight years. Mr. Doe also has an alcohol
problem that dates back at least five years. Recently Mr. Doe
has been unable to procure subcontracting jobs consistently
and has encountered difficulty in providing for his children as a
result. Apparently his financial problems led Mr. Doe to undertake this counterfeiting activity, and his role in the offense
was limited to passing notes that had been produced by a
friend.
On a grid similar to the current guidelines matrix let us suppose that the counterfeiting conviction is an offense level ten
and that Mr. Doe is in criminal history category II. In the proposed sentencing system the quantity of punishment that Mr.
Doe deserves would be equal to twelve sanction units. This
would replace the eight to fourteen months presumptive sentence in the current guidelines matrix.
The next step under the proposed structure would be consideration of purposes relevant to this particular case. In order to complete the purposes phase of the sentencing process
the judge need not evaluate the justifications for the sentencing system as a whole. He need only identify the purposes relevant to the case at hand and the characteristics that make
them relevant. The judge should attempt to understand the
offender as fully as possible in order to determine his needs
and to assess his dangerousness and potential for recidivism.
These are simple tasks, but judges must make an effort to articulate coherent principles in this heretofore uncharted area of
the law.
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In the case of Mr. Doe, just punishment is an important concern. Mr. Doe knowingly violated the law and in doing so undermined public confidence in government securities. He
deserves to be punished for his offense, and his punishment
should serve as a deterrent to similar acts that might be committed by Mr. Doe and others. Incapacitation is not a significant issue in this case because Mr. Doe does not pose a serious
threat to the safety of society. Rehabilitation, however, is a legitimate concern. An alcohol treatment program might improve Mr. Doe's ability to deal with an already difficult family
situation that has been complicated by financial problems.
Section 3553(a)(3) of the Act mandates the third step in the
sentencing process. The court must consider "the kind of
sentences available." Prison must remain the sentence of
choice whenever an extremely dangerous offender is involved
or whenever the offender has repeatedly failed to change his
ways after numerous encounters with the criminal justice system. The court must uphold respect for the law in these cases
and must protect the public as well. Since these kinds of offenders generally would have higher sanction values than
other offenders, the guidelines may establish a cut-off sanction
level beyond which nonincarcerative sanctions are presumptively unavailable.
In some sense the current guidelines adopt this approach by
barring probation in cases where the lower limit of the range is
six months. This cut-off level is well below the current practice
of a criminal justice system that has already overloaded its prisons. A better cut-off level would be approximately twenty
sanction units. This corresponds to about 30-37 months
under the current guidelines. Since Mr. Doe's sentence has a
sanction value of twelve units, the full range of nonimprisonment alternatives would be available.
Perhaps the most appropriate sanction in this case would be
restitution. Mr. Doe could be ordered to repay the recipient of
the counterfeit securities for the financial losses that were incurred as a result of the transaction. An additional monetary
penalty might be in order, but Mr. Doe's precarious financial
situation probably precludes it. A more effective alternative
would be to require Mr. Doe to donate his time to work on
community or charitable construction projects. As mentioned
earlier, rehabilitation might be achieved by a mandatory alcohol treatment program.
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The final step in the proposed guideline procedures is to
distribute the appropriate quantity of punishment among the
chosen sanctions. Each element of the sentence must carry its
own sanction value, and the sum of all the sanction values must
be determined by the guideline calculation. This contrasts
with the current guidelines, which assign a prison sentence to
the crime and then add on other sanctions such as fines, restitution, supervised release, and community service without altering the prison sentence. Under the guidelines these
additional sanctions do not count in measuring the quantity of
punishment.
Surely the guidelines are wrong when they effectively assign
a sanction value of zero to these punishments, yet one can understand the Commission's hesitancy to delve into this area.
How can a sentence of two months in prison be compared to
six months of intensive probation with 100 hours of community service? This type of inquiry has drawn increasing attention from scholars, but as Robinson notes, "preliminary
empirical research on the proper assignment of sanction values
to particular sanction 28
methods so far has resulted in mere in1
speculation."
formed
Uncertainty and a paucity of information should not have
dissuaded the Commission from attempting to establish exchange rates between sanctions. As Thomas Quinn points out,
"no logical scaling or quantification process preceded the establishment of the current [pre-guidelines] system ...
.
The Commission should have used available knowledge and
experience to set initial values that could be adjusted over
time. Robinson suggests that "[e]xperience with offender
preferences for one or another sanctioning method will quickly
identify overvalued sanctions."' 130
Robinson is right to focus on offender preferences because
the goal of reducing unwarranted disparity, the driving force
behind sentencing reform, has been fueled by offenders' perceptions that their sentences were harsher than similarly situated offenders. In the proposed scheme the Commission
would assign values to various kinds of sentences. Taking Mr.
128. Id. at 54 (citation omitted).
129. Quinn, Focusfor the Future.Accountability in Sentencing, March 1984
TION 10, 18.
130. Robinson, supra note 127, at 54-55.
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Doe's case, restitution of six thousand dollars in losses might
be worth four sanction units, 90-120 hours of community service might be worth four units, an alcohol treatment program
might count for two units, and an 11:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M. curfew for six months might be worth an additional two units.
The sum of these is twelve units, which would be equivalent to
the 8-14 month prison sentence. If the Commission finds that
these exchange rates contradict the data taken from offender
preferences, it can remedy this problem by making incremental
changes in the sanction values associated with each type of
sanction until offenders are indifferent between penalties that
carry equal sanction values.
III.

GUIDELINES SENTENCING AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS

On the surface the sentencing regime proposed in this article and the current guidelines do not differ radically. The proposed guidelines fit easily within the statutory framework
legislated by Congress. In fact, the proposed system is more
faithful to the intent of Congress because it gives full consideration to the purposes of sentencing and the variety of available
sentencing options without causing unwarranted disparity in
the quantity of punishment that offenders receive. On the
other hand, the conceptual distance between the two guideline
systems is enormous. The Commission's guidelines emphasize
uniformity and just punishment, while the proposed guidelines
see these concerns as limiting principles on an essentially utilitarian regime.
Since this article is written with the federal judiciary in mind
the following pertinent questions remain to be discussed.
First, how can a judge who shares the concerns expressed in
this article operate within the current guideline system? Second, by what means can the judiciary exert pressure on the
guidelines to bring them into conformity with the principles
embodied in the Sentencing Reform Act? Obviously these two
questions are closely related, but the first addresses the duty of
the judiciary to interpret and apply the law while the second
relates to the ability of judges to articulate principles that will
establish a common law of sentencing.
According to section 3553(b) of the Act a court is bound to
impose a sentence of a kind, and within the range, set forth in
the guidelines "unless the court finds that an aggravating or
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
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mitigating circumstance exists that was of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines and that should
result in a sentence different from that described."
Both Congress and the Commission recognized that they
could not undertake a sweeping reform of sentencing practice
without retaining a role for the discretion and experience of
the federal judiciary. The power to depart from the guidelines
lies at the heart of that role. In the Guidelines Manual the
Commission states that it could have specified that a particular
circumstance had been adequately considered and thereby
could have barred the court from departing for that reason.
The Manual clearly states, however, that "[i]n this initial set of
guidelines . . .the Commission does not so limit the courts'

departure powers." 13' Furthermore, the Commission admits
that "these initial guidelines are but the first step in an evolu13 2
tionary process."'

This article makes a prima facie case that the Commission
did not adequately consider nonimprisonment sanctions, the
purposes of sentencing, and the impact of the guidelines on
prison overcrowding. If the court believes that the presumptive guideline sentence is inappropriate in any given case for
one of these reasons, it is obliged to depart and impose a sentence that addresses these factors adequately. In a case like
Mr. Doe's, where the presumptive guideline sentence is 8-14
months in prison, but the court finds that because of the offender's background a rehabilitative sentence is warranted, the
court must fashion an alternative sentence such as probation
with community service and restitution. In another case the
court might find the prison sentence appropriate but for an
overcrowding crisis in the. nearby federal prisons. Provided
that the offender is not a serious threat to the public, a strictly
enforced home confinement sentence might be more appropriate. These kinds of departure sentences, which the guidelines
clearly allow, would permit the court to impose sentences that
are more just, effective and parsimonious than the presumptive
sentences dictated by numerical calculations.
The power to depart freely raises the specter of rampant,
unwarranted disparity-the precise evil that motivated federal
131. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, at Introduction p. 1.6.
132. Id. at Introduction p. 1.4.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss3/4

46

1989]

Lindemann:
Opening the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Alternatives
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

sentencing reform. Two innovations of the new sentencing regime safeguard against unwarranted disparity. First, section
3553(c) of the Act requires a statement of reasons to support
any departure sentence. Second, pursuant to section 3742 of
the Act either the defendant or the government may appeal
any departure sentence, depending on whether it is greater
than or less than the guideline sentence. Both provisions not
only act as a check on unwarranted disparity, but provide
courts with an opportunity to shape the new guidelines regime
over time as well.
Section 3553(c) requires the court to articulate the reasons
for any sentence imposed, even if it falls within the guidelines.
Although both Congress and the Commission acknowledged
the importance of a statement of reasons, neither enumerated
the required elements of such a statement. The Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law and Probation Administration, chaired by federal Judge Edward Becker, has
addressed this issue in a memorandum circulated in May of
1988.133 The memorandum discusses the requirements of section 3553(c), and proposes a standardized form on which a
judge can state his reasons. The form has three parts. First,
the court must make findings of fact. Second, the form requests the court to apply the guidelines to the findings of fact
and to specify the resulting presumptive sentencing range.
The final section requests the court to articulate its reasons
either for choosing a particular sentence within the presumptive range (if the range is greater than twenty-four months) or
for departing from the range.
Use of a standardized reasons form risks routine, boilerplate
answers that will not reveal much about the sentencing process. On the other end of the spectrum, unstructured sentencing opinions are difficult to analyze and digest and therefore
might prove less useful to the Sentencing Commission, judges,
and academics. The form created by Judge Becker's Committee attempts to strike a balance with its guided but open-ended
format.
The Committee's form represents a commendable effort to
133. Memorandum from the Honorable Edward R. Becker, Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law and Probation Administration, to all
federal judges, magistrates, circuit executives, district court executives, clerks of the
United States District Courts, and chief United States probation officers (May 1988).
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gather and organize the thinking of federal district court
judges on sentencing. However, the form is fundamentally
flawed in two respects. The most egregious error is one of
omission. The standardized reasons form does not require or
encourage the judge to state the purposes that motivate the
sentence. This omission contradicts the plain language of the
Sentencing Reform Act. Section 3553(a) of the Act obligates
the court to consider purposes in each case, and section
3553(c) requires the judge to state his reasons for imposing a
particular sentence, reasons which obviously should include
sentencing purposes.
Judge Becker's Committee would make an articulation of
purposes optional. The memorandum accompanying the reasons form states, "A judge may wish to state how the guideline
sentence selected serves the ends of sentencing called for by
the Sentencing Reform Act."''

3

4

The Committee would make

consideration and articulation of purposes mandatory only in
cases "[w]here the court concludes that the guidelines do not
comply with the Act."' 3 5 The Committee seems to be saying
that in a particular case purposes become relevant only if the
judge has already made a blanket determination that the
guidelines violate the statute. "[W]here the court is satisfied
that the guidelines comply with the Sentencing Reform Act, it
need not engage in such an exercise."'

3 6

Sentencing opinions without purposes are not only in violation of the Act, but are undesirable from a policy perspective
as well. A judge cannot shape the common law of sentencing
in any coherent way without addressing purposes in his sentencing opinion. Merely stating that a particular type of sentence is appropriate in a given case will neither bind nor
persuade other courts when they encounter similar cases. Sentencing opinions that explain the purposes behind each sentence are far more likely to establish lasting sentencing norms.
The second flaw in the Committee's reasons form is the order in which the elements of the form appear. Ordering may
seem insignificant, but, as explained above, the order in which
certain factors are analyzed may strongly influence sentencing
134. Id. at 10.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 11.
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outcome. I3 7 Inasmuch as the reasons form reflects the desired
thought process of the judge, the order in which the elements
on the form are presented becomes important. An alternative
format for sentencing opinions, which will promote full consideration of sentencing purposes and all available sanction options is necessary. One such format is described below.
A prerequisite to sentencing is that the court must make
findings of fact concerning the specific offense and the offender's characteristics. Consequently, the sentencing opinion
begins with a section in which the court describes the pertinent
facts of the case. On the basis of these facts the court considers purposes, and in the second section of the opinion the
court explains the degree to which each purpose is relevant to
the sentencing decision in the case at hand. The court should
also state the reasons why these purposes are relevant. In
other words, the court describes the facts which implicate each
purpose. Next, the judge enumerates the types of sentencing
options that might serve the designated purposes and explains
the reasons for imposing one sanction or a combination of
sanctions over another.
Through this procedure, the judge expresses the ways in
which his own knowledge and experience in sentencing influences the outcome in the case at hand. In the pre-guidelines
system, this rarely occurred. If the guidelines only accomplished this much, simply forcing judges to express the
thought process that went into a sentence, the new system
would be a vast improvement on prior practice.
The next phase of the opinion brings the guidelines into
play. The judge calculates the presumptive guideline sentence
range or adopts the probation officer's calculations. Then the
judge compares his preferred sentence with the sanctions
available within the presumptive guideline range. If the preferred sentence falls outside the range the judge should not
hesitate to depart and to explain the reasons for doing so.
If a departure is warranted, it may take three forms: dispositional, quantitative, or both. Dispositional means that the preferred sentence is of a kind not available within the
presumptive range. This might occur when the judge prefers a
nonimprisonment sanction, but the lower limit of the guideline
137. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
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range is greater than six months. A quantitative departure is
warranted where the guideline sentencing range does not adequately reflect the amount of punishment necessary to accomplish the purposes of sentencing. The court also may wish to
impose a sentence that differs in both kind and amount of punishment in appropriate cases.
Whenever the judge departs, he must explain why his preferred sentence is superior to a sentence within the guideline
range. In doing so he should also describe the means by which
he weighed the sanction values of the two sentences and settled on the duration or conditions of the sentence imposed. If
the judge chooses not to depart, a statement outlining the appropriateness of the guideline sentence would also be in order.
Whether the judge departs or not, the sentencing opinions
generated from this process can have a great impact on federal
sentencing practice. Ideally, the opinions would be published,
perhaps in some sort of sentencing law reporter. 3 8 At a minimum other judges should have access to sentencing opinions,
even if they are not regarded as binding precedent. The opinions also provide a basis for appellate review of the sentence.
If the reasons stated in the opinion tend to create unwarranted
disparity, or violate the terms and objectives of the Act in any
other ways, the appellate court may reverse the decision.
Otherwise the trial court opinion will stand. Both on appeal
and at trial a rich, well-reasoned trial court opinion will influence the common law of sentencing to a greater extent than a
short, boilerplate statement of reasons.
Sentencing opinions also provide feedback to the Sentencing Commission, which has an obligation to evaluate sentencing practice under the guidelines as it emerges. The
Commission's task did not end on November 1, 1987. The
Commission is a permanent body that possesses the authority
to amend the guidelines. As courts depart from the guidelines,
the Commission will oversee the process of reform. "By monitoring when courts depart from the guidelines and by analyzing their stated reasons for doing so, the Commission, over
time, will be able to create more accurate guidelines."'' 3 9
138. An excellent example of such a reporter is the Federal Sentencing Reporter,
published under the auspices of the Vera Institute of Justice.
139. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, at Introduction p. 1.7.
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CONCLUSION

The federal sentencing guidelines initiate an opportunity for
dialogue between federal courts and the United States Sentencing Commission. If federal judges do not hold up their
end of the conversation, however, the objectives of the Sentencing Reform Act will never be achieved. In the gestation
period before the guidelines emerged the Commission neither
sought nor received adequate input from the federal judiciary.
Now that the guidelines are in place judges have another opportunity. As judges begin to sentence offenders under the
new system, the guidelines invite them to express their concerns about the guidelines and their visions of ways in which
the system can work better. This article has suggested a philosophy of sentencing and a framework for sentencing opinions that will encourage judges to consider the purposes of
sentencing and the wide range of sentencing options available.
Judges must not acquiesce to inadequate guideline sentences
nor abdicate their responsibility to consider all factors relevant
to deciding the fate of the human offender who stands before
the court at sentencing.
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